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In the midst of on-going hype about the power and potency of the new brain sciences,
scholars within “Critical Neuroscience” have called for a more nuanced and sceptical
neuroscientific knowledge-practice. Drawing especially on the Frankfurt School, they
urge neuroscientists towards a more critical approach—one that re-inscribes the objects
and practices of neuroscientific knowledge within webs of social, cultural, historical
and political-economic contingency. This paper is an attempt to open up the black-box
of “critique” within Critical Neuroscience itself. Specifically, we argue that limiting
enactments of critique to the invocation of context misses the force of what a
highly-stylized and tightly-bound neuroscientific experiment can actually do. We show
that, within the neuroscientific experiment itself, the world-excluding and context-denying
“rules of the game” may also enact critique, in novel and surprising forms, while
remaining formally independent of the workings of society, and culture, and history. To
demonstrate this possibility, we analyze the Optimally Interacting Minds (OIM) paradigm,
a neuroscientific experiment that used classical psychophysical methods to show that,
in some situations, people worked better as a collective, and not as individuals—a claim
that works precisely against reactionary tendencies that prioritize individual over collective
agency, but that was generated and legitimized entirely within the formal, context-denying
conventions of neuroscientific experimentation. At the heart of this paper is a claim that it
was precisely the rigors and rules of the experimental game that allowed these scientists
to enact some surprisingly critical, and even radical, gestures. We conclude by suggesting
that, in the midst of large-scale neuroscientific initiatives, it may be “experiment”, and
not “context”, that forms the meeting-ground between neuro-biological and socio-political
research practices.
Keywords: Critical Neuroscience, experiment, critique, the social, sociology of neuroscience, optimally interacting
minds, interdisciplinarity
INTRODUCTION
What is there still to say about the growth and prominence of
the new brain sciences? Almost 10 years ago, Steven Rose (2005)
pointed out that “the global scale of research effort now put
into the neurosciences primarily in the US, but closely followed
by Europe and Japan, has turned them from classical ‘little sci-
ences’, into a major industry engaging large teams of researchers,
involving billions of dollars from government. . .and the phar-
maceutical industry” (Rose, 2005: 3). With the recent advent of
the Human Brain Project (Honigsbaum, 2013), and the BRAIN
initiative (Markoff and Gorman, 2013), this narrative of growth
and expansion has scarcely changed. Certainly, if their influence
(and desire for influence) is sometimes over-stated, neuroscien-
tific spaces are now among the most potent and creative sites
for understanding human beings, their subjectivities, and their
societies (Andreasen, 2001; Pickersgill et al., 2011; Rose and Abi-
Rached, 2013).
Unsurprisingly, as the neurosciences have grown in size,
prominence and prestige, so has critical sociological, philosoph-
ical, and historical analysis grown up around their foothills
(Martin, 2000; Dumit, 2004; Ortega and Vidal, 2007). Such
works range from critiques of a frightening “neuro-reductionism”
(Martin, 2004), to interest in the philosophical implications of
neuroscience (Malabou, 2008), to a more delicate labor of carving
out shared spaces of interest between the neuro-and social sci-
ences (Roepstorff and Frith, 2012; Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013;
see also Fitzgerald and Callard, Forthcoming, for an analysis of
these modes of engagement). In recent years, however, “Criti-
cal Neuroscience” has emerged as perhaps the most prominent,
and certainly the most self-consciously “critical”, framework for
thinking about the relationship between neuroscience, society,
politics and economics (Choudhury et al., 2009; Slaby, 2010;
Slaby and Choudhury, 2012). Put crudely, scholars within this
tradition, sometimes rooted in the Frankfurt School, and usually
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tilting at the hidden political and economic entanglements of
neuroscientific assumptions, try to pull the experimental rhetoric
and practice of neuroscience away from an organizing fantasy of
distanced facthood, and towards a more concretely political and
reflexive socio-critique –re-inscribing the objects of neuroscien-
tific practice back within the webs of social, cultural and historical
context to which they are always inevitably subject (Choudhury
et al., 2009).
What follows here is also an essay on neuroscience and cri-
tique. The paper is not a tediously scholastic disagreement with
Critical Neuroscience: we have found too much of value in its
corpus, have learned too much from the scholars within it, and
have shared in too many events that have explored and expanded
its core rubrics. Moreover, as scholars who labor in, on, and
through, the contemporary neurosciences, we remain sensitive to
the acuity of, and creative potential in, a critical insistence on
the looping relationships between facts, politics, ideologies, and
publics. But we also think that there are important lacunae in
the growth of Critical Neuroscience. In this paper, we re-visit the
relationship between neuroscience and critique, to propose that
a more “critical” neuroscience is not only one that is attentive to
its own context; sometimes, we suggest, a critical neuroscientific
statement is produced through precisely the opposite strategy—
by focusing on, and working with, the internal, world-excluding
dynamics of the neuroscientific experiment. Our core argument is
that limiting enactments of critique to social or historical context
misses the force of what a highly-stylized and tightly-bounded
neuroscientific experiment can actually do. We will show how
the neuroscientific experiment may also enact critique, in novel
and surprising ways, formally independent of an attention to the
workings of society, or culture, or history.
We center this argument on one case study: a series of experi-
ments called “Optimally Interacting Minds” (OIM), published in
Science by Bahador Bahrami et al. in 2010. Two things interest
us about this study: (1) it is made-up of a tightly-bound series of
experimental demonstrations, cleaving closely to the conventional
rules that make up the experimental game of psychophysics; and
(2) it enacts and legitimizes a number of potentially “critical”
interventions about the virtues of social and collective life, about
the suboptimal performance and reasoning of the private individ-
ual, and about the nuanced—and deeply political—relationship
of evidence and knowledge to forms of shared decision-making.
We use this experiment to argue that “experiment”, as much as
“context”, is a good basis for bringing a more “critical” neuro-
science into being. But we will also suggest that such a focus may
require the dilution of a well-worn (and perhaps, now, rather
comfortable) insistence that the neuroscientist needs to focus on
the indelible presence of “society” and “history” and “politics”
and “economics” within her procedures. It requires commenta-
tors to think also about the rules of the experimental game itself,
about the procedures that grant it its potency, and about the kinds
of statements that those procedures make possible.
The paper is in four parts: first, drawing especially on three
programmatic texts (Choudhury et al., 2009; Slaby, 2010; Slaby
and Choudhury, 2012) we offer a short exegesis of Critical Neuro-
science, isolating what, precisely, is intended by the word “critical”
within it; we then offer a brief account of the boundaries of
experimentalism in social psychology and neuroscience; third, we
introduce the OIM experiment, locating its core critical inter-
vention in the broader sweep of neuroscientific experimentation;
in the final section, we argue for a new way of relating to the
neuroscientific experiment, whose rules and traditions, arcane as
they seem, are not so isolated from critical and political statements
as they sometimes appear. We conclude with a suggestion that,
pace much discussion hitherto, it might be “experiment”, and
not “context”, that forms the critical meeting-ground between
neuro-biological and socio-political research practices, in the 21st
century.
LOCATING CRITIQUE
At its heart, Critical Neuroscience is an attempt “to respond, both
philosophically and scientifically, to the impressive and at times
troublesome surge of the neurosciences” (Slaby and Choudhury,
2012: 29). Authors within this genre are not working to destabilize
neuroscience: their more parsimonious and constructive goal is
to question the broader cultural urge towards neuroscientific
explanations, to point to the problematic bases both of this urge
and of the brain science it wills into existence, and to imagine,
beyond both, a different sort of neuroscience—one that is able
to question its own “givens” and to recognize its own history
and context; a discipline in which “historical, anthropological,
philosophical, and sociological analysis can feed back and provide
creative potential for experimental research in the laboratory”
(ibid.: 29–30). At the center of this enterprise is a single qualifier:
“critical”. It is the will to critique that legitimizes this programme,
that drives it forward, and that organizes resources around it:
“grounded in a framework of critical theorizing”, Choudhury
et al. (2009) write elsewhere, “and in view of the social and
cultural factors that shape research agendas and theories, Critical
Neuroscience suggests ways to equip neuroscientific research with
basic tools of critical practice” (Choudhury et al., 2009: 74).
But what, exactly, is the “critical” in “Critical Neuroscience”?
Confronted with what they see –following Axel Honneth—as
an emerging set of “social pathologies of reason” between the
neurosciences and their contexts, Critical Neuroscience scholars
interpret their task as opening up the black box of scientific fact-
hood, and unveiling the deeply contingent socio-historical logics
embedded within the neuroscientific fact (ibid.: 65 cf. Martínez
Mateo et al., 2013). But what we wish to briefly explore here
is the intellectual history and disciplinary genealogy mobilized
by this term—including the forms of political, epistemological
and economic commitment that are both held together within
it, and excluded from it. If there is not space in this paper for
an intellectual history of the urge to “critique” as such (see de
Boer and Sonderegger, 2012), still we want to situate the use of
this term more precisely within the broader oeuvre of a Critical
Neuroscience.
Within that literature, various intellectual forebears are
claimed for critique, including Kant (Slaby and Choudhury,
2012), Axel Honneth (Kirmayer, 2012), and even Bruno Latour
(Slaby, 2010). But if it seems difficult to assemble this inheritance
into a coherent programme, in practice its articulation leads to
a number of specific looping interests. For Choudhury et al.
(2009), a “critical” approach to neuroscience is an unmasking
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of the scientific “brain-fact”, a conceptual and anthropological
exposure of the journey that mental phenomena take on their way
to facthood, and an undermining of the political and economic
contexts, media interests, lay perceptions, and so on, that are
braided through that “fact” along the way (Choudhury et al.,
2009: 65). For Campbell (2010), a year later, a critical neuro-
science is straightforwardly positioned as one “more attuned to
the ‘social”’, (Campbell, 2010: 101). “What is at stake”, Campbell
argues, is precisely “how social factors will be addressed—who
is best positioned to address them through what vocabularies
and with what goals?” (ibid.). For Kirmayer (2012), a critical
approach directs attentions specifically to the forms of cul-
tural reasoning underpinned by the “neuro” prefix: critique, in
Kirmayer’s account, “is our vehicle through which to focus on
popular culture, as well as neuroscientific and technical rationality
and their economic and political motivations” (Kirmayer, 2012:
367).
What binds these understandings together, and legitimizes the
use of “critique” within Critical Neuroscience, is a commitment
to a particular form of politics—a politics that is otherwise taken
to be effaced from the rhetorical and experimental game that
entangles the neurobiological mainstream. This commitment is
perhaps most clearly expressed in Slaby and Choudhury’s (2012)
“Proposal for a Critical Neuroscience” (2012) where they argue
that that their venture “opens up a space for inquiry that is itself
inherently and self-consciously political” (29). For Critical Neu-
roscience in general, this space is rooted in “the persuasion that
scientific inquiry into human reality tends to mobilize specific
values and often works in the service of interests that can easily
shape construals of nature and naturalness” (ibid.). Or as they put
it elsewhere in the same text, the overarching goal is to “analyze
the allure and functions of the neuro in the broader scheme of
intellectual and political contexts” (ibid.: 45). And again: “Critical
Neuroscience should not stop at description and complexifi-
cation”, being concerned instead with the “depoliticalization of
scholarship in the face of the increasing commercialization of
academia. . .a more radical and openly political positioning is
needed in [the] face of these trends” (ibid.: 31).
Here, we draw an important distinction: for Critical Neuro-
science, the argument is not that an apolitical scientific practice
should suddenly become political; there is no assumption at all
that there is no politics in neuroscience as it is currently con-
stituted. Instead the argument is that: (1) a falsely depoliticized
rhetorical and conceptual apparatus of neuroscientific experi-
mentation and dissemination has excised, or hidden, the inherent
political inputs of the neuroscientific enterprise, in its pursuit of
a neutral-looking facthood; (2) said apparatus would be better
served if it began to recognize the political assumptions and
priorities that are always-already in it; and (3) in particular,
the same apparatus should distance itself from a misguided
rhetorical game of distanced facthood, which merely draws a
veil over, and thus reifies, the cultural and political biases that
are always (inevitably) in the experiment. It is thus not neuro-
science as such, but the (broadly understood) material-semiotic
experimental game of neuroscientific facthood, and what the
game is understood to be for—including its manifestations in
hypothesizing, disseminating, translating and so on—that is at
stake in this claim for a re-politicization of the neuroscientific
enterprise.
The immediate target and direction of a re-politicized neu-
roscientific apparatus, and of the neurobiological fact it draws
forth, takes different forms. In the “Proposal”, particular emphasis
is placed on “the commercialization of research. . .[such that]
sociological analysis can highlight the pressures that commercial,
pharmaceutical, and military interests place on neuroscience”—
especially given that “scientists are not usually trained to be very
sensitive to the subtleties of, and social conflicts within, political
and institutional environments” (ibid.: 43, 39). Elsewhere, the
authors seek
a discursive space for debate both in professional and practical
domains about the categories and application of neuroscience,
and about related social issues such as the organization of labor,
conception of health and disease, goals and practices in parenting
and education, issues about law and punishment, technological
self-optimization, and much more (ibid.: 40).
In other texts, authors point to the burgeoning relations
between neuroscience and national security industries (Marks,
2010); the growth of a pharmaceuticalised biological psychia-
try (Kirmayer, 2012); the removal of “the social” from concep-
tions of addiction (Campbell, 2010); the troubling relationship
between neuroscientific findings and management techniques
(Slaby, 2010); the neurobiologization of crime (Choudhury et al.,
2009)—and so on. In each case, whatever the locus of atten-
tion, the call to “critique” is a call to make manifest, and then
reform, the political in the neuroscientific experiment, to which
extent politics is located in moments and processes where such
experiments, and the rhetoric of facthood that surrounds them,
have an effect on, or are taken up by, actors with commercial,
governmental or other neoliberal ends, thus having reactionary
outcomes within the mundane politics of crime, labor, illness,
security, and justice.
That such issues look like the bread and butter of a
traditionally-minded social science is not a coincidence. For it
is “the social”, understood in its unreconstructed Durkheimian
sense, that gathers up and justifies this remit: “critical neuro-
science puts particular emphasis on the social” argue Slaby and
Choudhury (2012): 36. Against (what they see as) a dominant
“actor network theory” approach within the study of scientific
practices and experiments, Slaby and Choudhury insist on “the
social” as “a potential explanatory resource”—allowing analysts to
avoid a quietist “neutral” cartography, and instead to “penetrate
beneath the surface of emerging practices, relations, and styles
into the dynamics of power that may shape or stabilize sur-
face phenomena, facilitate or hinder certain alliances or actions”
(ibid.: 37; cf. Rose, 1996; Durkheim, 1982 [1895]). These authors,
of course, are perfectly aware that, in the early 21st century, such
an approach is somewhat passé: they explicitly refuse an old-
fashioned account of the social as a view-from-nowhere explanans
of all human phenomena, and stress (indeed, precisely following
the actor-network approach that they are elsewhere suspicious
of; see Callon, 1986) the processual “assemblage” of this “social”
within a multitude of actors and practices. But thus trying to find
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a way—not always clearly or convincingly—between very differ-
ent ways of conjuring the social, they refuse quietist tendencies
embedded in recent sociological attention to scientific practices,
insisting that “the activity of assemblage, in our sense of the term
is . . .an inherently political one” (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012: 38,
my emphasis).
This reliance on a self-consciously “political” socio-critique
in the old style is, of course, perfectly respectable—if not very
fashionable. Still, an important tension comes into view here: if
these authors are committed to an epistemological politics sus-
pended somewhere between Kant and the Frankfurt School, they
are aware that this way of understanding critique, and this mode
of doing politics, have both been convincingly superseded within
the very social science literature upon whose methods and per-
spectives they are so reliant (e.g., Latour, 2004). What is centrally
at stake for Critical Neuroscience, then, is an attempt to enact a
form of critical attention to the neurosciences, from the point of
view of the social—at a moment in which precisely such a mode
of attention has been orphaned by the intellectual practices who
claim the social as their own, and who thus form the empirical
and theoretical ground upon which Critical Neuroscience seeks its
contribution. Perhaps the fullest expression of this tension comes
in an article by Slaby (2010). “The challenge”, he writes, “is to
render ‘critique’ meaningful again in a time when this notion
has fallen into disrepute in mainstream thought and theory”
(Slaby, 2010: 410). For Slaby, Latour’s re-invigoration of scientific
facthood as “matters of concern” (i.e., stable entities whose sta-
bility is nonetheless an ongoing achievement; see Latour, 2008)
permits (contra Latour’s own view) a re-invigoration of the role
of critique—which, for Slaby (2010), is not a mere debunking of
scientific authority, but a much more generative and constructive
enrichment of scientific facthood, now thickly embroiled with
matters of “human interest” (Slaby, 2010: 411). Critique, in
Slaby’s account, calls political attention, amid the neutral-looking
assembly of matters-of-concern, to who or what is doing all that
concerning—and to whose concern gets excluded at the same
time. For Slaby, “the assembling [of] matters of concern from
multiple perspectives can provide a balancing force against the
monopoly of experts and specialist associations” (ibid.). Here,
“context” is the lever: the task is “to reinscribe the relevant influ-
ences and multiple causal factors, point to historical trajectories,
and record cultural understandings and differences” (ibid). The
summoning-up of context does not efface the neurobiology of
a topic like addiction, but instead provides a “much richer”
account that can build upon the “meager construal” of a neuronal
reductionism (ibid). The work of the critic, then, is to identify
interests, to seek out pathologies of reason, to begin a transdisci-
plinary discussion about the normative underpinnings of these
interventions—and then to include all of this in some specific
neuroscientific practice or encounter (ibid.: 411–412).
Given that Latour has been invoked by these authors them-
selves, we may rely on his rubric to point to some of the prob-
lems here. Certainly, authors within Critical Neuroscience want
critique not to be the debunking, denouncing, killjoy of yore,
and they situate the critical urge as a positive, additive function
in the practice of neuroscience. But they remain committed to a
view of, specifically, a neuroscientific research-practice which is:
(1) de-politicized through its firm rhetorical exclusion of human
social and cultural worlds (of interests, ideologies, economies,
and so on); but also (2) nonetheless irretrievably political, if only
in the sense that, by drawing a veil across these interests and
ideologies, it reifies the (troubling) contexts in which its own
performance takes place. At the heart of this view, then, is an
idea that the experimental game of neuroscience itself relies on a
distinction between, on the one hand, things that are human, and
political, and economic, and unavoidably inflected by context,
and, on the other hand, things that are scientific, and biological,
and embodied, and best understood in laboratories. To put it
another way, the argument of Critical Neuroscience is that even
if the neurobiological sciences remain, at base, deeply human,
cultural and political endeavors, the atomized brain-fact, and
the experimental game that produces that fact, are the products
of a technified attempt to exclude, cover-over, or simply ignore
that human, cultural and political base. A better—more critical—
research-practice is one that calls a halt to this misguided game of
exclusion, denial, veiling, and so on.
If the committed Latourian surely agrees with Critical Neu-
roscience that some kind of politics, or interest, or agency, is
inseparable from the generation of brain-facts, we will hardly find
room in her thought for the imagination of a research-practice
which succeeds precisely by relying on a distinction between the
human world of context and politics, and the laboratory arena of
neutrality and facthood. For Latour, of course, and quite unlike
the core claims of Critical Neuroscience, there is no successful
or sustainable fact-producing machine, no meaningful theatre
of experimentation, to which politics and interest have been
rendered external; there is no God-given task for the philosopher
or the sociologist to “piece together the social, political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural factors involved in the development of
neuroscientific insights” (Choudhury et al., 2009: 65). If Critical
Neuroscience seeks a space for its own analysis in the “the selec-
tive attitude and methodological reductionism of experimental
approaches” (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012: 25), Latour reminds
us that there is no experimentally-generated fact, no disseminated
finding, no “depoliticalized” “matter of concern”, which has not
always-already been generated, sustained and circulated precisely
through a careful attention to, and cultivation of, its own complex
bundle of interest, conviction, care, deviousness, misunderstand-
ing, hope, hucksterism, and so on—the careful assemblage of which
is the sole guarantee of successful “facthood” in the first place. Put
more simply: there is, in Latour’s account, no successful scientific
object, and no potent experimental practice, to which interest,
context, politics, and democracy have been successfully rendered
external, except in the most trivial sense. There can be no additive
function for “critique”, moreover, unless it is founded on the idea
that successful experimental practices are about producing facts
without, or exclusive of, or even only in denial of, context, and
discussion, and politics, and interest—an assumption, in other
words, that we would have better facts, and more democratic
ones too, if these externalized relations were much more on the
surface, much more reflected-upon, much more open to critique.
This is, finally, how we must understand the critical gesture at
the heart of Critical Neuroscience. Despite appeals otherwise, it
is locked within a social-scientific and philosophical literature
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whose organizing premise is that elaboration of the political is
external to the rules of the neurobiological-experimental game,
at least as it currently stands. That game is what we turn to in the
next section of the paper.
RE-THINKING THE EXPERIMENTAL
Of course, experimentation has been a central object of investi-
gation in histories and philosophies of science for some time—
and we cannot do justice to a long literature here (Kuhn,
1976; Bachelard, 1984 [1933]; Rheinberger, 2001). In recent
decades, however, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has brought discussion
of experimental maneuvers to the forefront of histories of sci-
ence, stressing that research does not typically begin with the
choice of a theoretical framework, but in fact with the choice
of a specific technological system; for Rheinberger (2001), it is
the experimental system, and not necessarily the hypothesis or
the theory, that lies at the center of the knowledge-production
process (Rheinberger, 2001: 19, 21f.). For the psychological
sciences (including social psychology) especially, with their waver-
ing affiliations to “science” as such (Ash, 1992), there are well-
known accounts of these disciplines’ historical trajectory towards
experimentalism, and into positive science (Danziger, 1992;
Greenwood, 1994). Danziger has stressed, nonetheless, that this
trajectory is not self-evident—since none of the emerging social
sciences were experimental in their methodology (Danziger, 2000:
331). The emergence of an experimental rubric for (social) psy-
chology thus required the imagination of a specific—and decid-
edly non-neutral—relationship between method and object: for
pioneering social psychologists like Floyd Allport, Danziger points
out, “it was impossible to advance a credible case for a method-
ology of scientific experimentation on any social object without
redefining that object in a nontraditional way” (ibid.: 332–3.).
Thus, early experimental psychology employed methods that
were “limited to exploring effects that were local, proximal, short
term, and decomposable” (ibid.: 334). These conventions were
made possible, of course, by redefining prior notions of the
social in social science, which in turn were based on “effects
that were non-local, distal, long-term, and experimentally non-
decomposable” (ibid.). As empirical investigation in social psy-
chology developed, and in common with developments elsewhere
in the psychological sciences, statistical methods moved to the
forefront of experimental technique (Porter, 1996). It was then
a short step for statistical significance to become the experi-
mental apparatus of choice “for decisions about the validity of
psychological hypotheses” (Danziger, 1994: 154). Again, we skate
over a great deal of complexity here—but what interests us is
the role of this complex “surface of emergence” within social-
psychological experimentation, especially as that rubric has more
recently become entangled in the neurosciences. Cromby (2007),
for example, reminds us that experimenting with social life in the
neurosciences is a process of generating fixity over contingency,
of emphasizing social cause over social influence, of replacing
collective representation with embodied reification, and so on: the
risk for experimenters, Cromby points out, is in confusing “rigidly
measured differences between experimenter-constituted groups
obtained in highly artificial circumstances” with “actual social
processes in everyday life” (Cromby, 2007: 164). As Simon Cohn
(2008) shows, in social neuroscience experiments especially, the
“social” gets mapped onto the brain and has to be conceptualized
as a material object: the experimental focus is not on the space of
interaction, at what people do or what happens between them; the
interest is directed towards what happens within the individual
brain (Cohn, 2008: 100).
These descriptions, and cautions, about the emergence of an
experimental game within social psychology and neuroscience,
and especially about how the rules of that game figure social life,
are well taken. And yet what interests us is less the historicization
or contextualization of that game as such—and more what its
conventions and its rules allow us to do, and to say. At the risk
of appearing naïve, in what follows we will temporarily set aside
our usual suspicions and ironies about this game, and about
the broader forces and relations of power that impinge upon
it. If experimental facthood in neuroscience—even the idea of
such facthood—is a function of context-dependent rules, then
what follows here is an optimistic story about the affordance
of context, and not another lamentation about its constraint.
We are fundamentally interested, first, in what a highly-stylized
and tightly-bounded neuroscientific experiment can actually do,
and, second, in the relationship between the limits and rules of
this game, and the enactment of specific kinds of statements.
The term “statements” is deliberately vague, here—we use it to
draw attention to the broad enunciative lifeworld of neurosci-
entific experiments, and to the kinds of things that particular
experiments make it possible to think, and to say. Consider, in
this sense, a seminal study in social neuroscience—Tania Singer
et al.’s studies on pain and empathy, published in Science in
2004 (Singer et al., 2004). Singer investigated how women, lying
in an fMRI scanner, responded neurally to pain experienced
by their romantic partners. The paper begins with a general
observation: “Human survival depends on the ability to function
effectively within a social context” (Singer et al., 2004: 1157). The
authors emphasize that effectively functioning in such a context
is embedded in the capacity to understand “others intentions
and beliefs”—but it also requires empathy, or “being able to
understand what others feel” (ibid.). The experimenters thus take
16 couples, placing one member of each in the scanner, and the
other elsewhere in the room. Both are given a pain stimulus,
and fMRI measures are taken from the subject in the scanner
both during the reception of her own stimulus, and, separately,
while she sees her partner receiving a pain stimulus. To cut a
complex story short: similar brain regions were active both when
the subject in the scanner received the stimulus and when she
was given a signal that her partner was receiving the stimulus
(recruiting brain regions associated with the affective dimensions
of pain, but not the sensory dimensions).
In one sense of course, and without wishing in the slightest to
denigrate this fascinating study, one might say that—aside from
neuroanatomical specificity—there is a certain mundaneness to
its conclusion. Who after all, is surprised to learn that emotions
are contagious, or that we feel the pain of others, or that if you
are romantically involved with someone, you probably know how
that person feels in certain situations? But, as the experimental
situation unfolds, a kind of strangeness emerges too. Because we
begin with a very artificial-looking, densely-rule-bound situation:
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in the experimental setting, a person lying in the scanner must
rate the level of pain of her loved one, whose hand she only sees on
a tilted mirror. And she knows that this “pain” is only a small, con-
trolled prick in an experimental setting; there is no major trauma.
And yet, harnessing the force of its measures, this rather artificial
construct of experimental rules and regulations, as applied to
the empathic experience of pain, is, nonetheless, skillfully—and
convincingly—traced to a very general, and very striking remark
about the survival of the human species in general, and the
role that social context and empathy plays in that survival—
via a rather specific and carefully demonstrated observation that
understanding the feelings of others has a comparable neural
architecture to understanding our own feelings.
It is this dynamic of the strange and the mundane that we
wish to keep in play here, and especially in our discussion of the
experiment that follows. Because, in both of these studies, what
appear to be highly artificial claims about very commonsensical
phenomena, can nonetheless enact, legitimize, and authorize,
some very striking, and potent, and not at all obvious, claims
about the social world and its human inhabitants in general. The
temptation for the external observer is to only focus on one half
of this dynamic: but if we focus only on the strange half (on the
tightly-bound, carefully-quantified artificial game that allows us
to say something convincing about empathy, and about human
social life in general), then we risk taking the whole thing rather
too seriously: it is a powerful biological reductionism making very
grand claims; it quantifies and neurobiologizes human social life;
it locates evolutionary history in romantic partnership, and so
on. On the other hand, if we only focus on the mundane aspects
of the experiment, we run the opposite risk—we do not take it
seriously enough, insisting that all it does, really, is reproduce, in
a highly complex technocratic language, in neatly quantified and
modeled form, something that of course we have already known
for many years. What we want to do, in our consideration of the
experiment that follows, is hold onto both halves of this binary,
and focus on the dynamic between them. What would happen if
we took the experiment just seriously enough? Could we learn
to see it as a game, with particular rules, and constructs, and
rituals, that—played well—sometimes allows the generation, and
then also the legitimation, of some very remarkable statements?
Could we see it as a game in which the rules and conventions
might be manipulated, and played-around-with, such that other
kinds of statements might become possible? Most importantly:
could a critical understanding of an experiment be one that seeks
to understand, to replicate, and even to admire, the style of an
experimental game that makes a particular statement possible?
Might we even, pursuing this inversion, describe a naïve analysis
of an experiment as one that takes its own sudden awareness
of the game to be both the start- and end-point of considered
investigation?
By a game “played well”, here, we refer only to an experimental
demonstration made convincingly and sustainably—i.e., one that
has achieved force, or gained strength, to draw again on the
Latourian vocabulary (Latour, 1988: 158–162). Our interest is in
the relationship between such demonstrations and the possibility
of subsequent “statements”—statements, for example, as above,
about the entanglement of social relationships, affect, and human
survival; or, indeed, as we will discuss below, about the con-
nections between sociality, co-operation, communication, and
success. We stress that we are not trying to construct a timeless or
universal rubric for the analysis of experiments—questions about
power, about the implications of experiments, about historical
context and so on, surely remain pertinent. What we add here,
much more modestly, is just another way of thinking about
neuroscientific experiments—one that is not currently prominent
within the critical literature, and yet that might (this is the core
gambit of the paper) have the capacity to significantly diffract
how we imagine the experiment’s relationship to critique, and to
politics.
AN OPTIMALLY CRITICAL EXPERIMENT
The OIM experiment was conducted in Aarhus (Denmark) by
Bahador Bahrami and a group of researchers affiliated with
Aarhus University and University College London (Bahrami et al.,
2010). The purpose of the experiment was to determine the
information-sharing conditions under which a pair of individu-
als, co-operating to make perceptual judgements about abstract
visual stimuli, might outperform the judgements of the best
individual in that pair; the authors were interested in “how signals
from the same sensory modality (vision) in the brains of two
different individuals, could be combined in a social interaction”
(1081). Stated more plainly, the purpose of the experiment was—
as the abstract suggested—to test the truth of a well-known cliché:
“are two heads really better than one?” (ibid.).
In this section, we use this experiment to illuminate the ways
in which dynamics between the strange and the mundane can be
enlivened within the experimental space of a contemporary neu-
roscience. But we also dwell on this experiment because it helps to
show, perhaps under the bland surface of much social psychology
and social neuroscience, the potential for some unexpected traffic
between enactments of “the social” and rhetorics of “critique”—
a traffic that, we claim, is occluded by the insistence on a rigid
separation between these domains. In some ways, the question
posed by the OIM experiment could scarcely have been more
humdrum. At the same time, the experiment also significantly
rippled the epistemological surface from which it grew—such that
it has now come to play an important critical role in relation to
that background, and in particular to the way that it has both
imagined and enacted specific iterations of “the social”. There is
hardly space here to give an adequate account of the histories of
social and behavioral psychology (for which see e.g., Danziger,
1992; Greenwood, 1994)—nor, indeed, can we do justice to the
wavering history of “the social” within the economic, behavioral,
psychological, and social sciences (Rose, 1996), or to the often
subterranean critical psychologies that have quietly torqued this
history (Burman, 1994). Our goal is slightly different: in pursuit
of some critical imperatives that are already in contemporary
neuropsychology experiments, we take the OIM experiment as
exemplary of a specific field of possibility. This will require some
unavoidably broad historical brushstrokes, in order to give a sense
of the wider surface of emergence.
Among the foundational themes of 20th century, Anglo-
American empirical social psychology was a concern with how
peoples’ judgements and behaviors were influenced though
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 365 | 6
Fitzgerald et al. What’s so critical about Critical Neuroscience?
interactions with others (Allport, 1920; see Parkovnick, 2000,
for a contextualization of this programme). If the “social” in
“social psychology” has not always been clear (Greenwood, 1994),
and indeed, social psychology itself an often disunited science
of differentially “social” traditions (Good, 2000)—nonetheless,
we might broadly see, within the advent of a “social” psychol-
ogy, the assemblage of experimental and conceptual spaces for
imagining forms of motive and intent beyond the individual.
But this relationship has not always made for happy inferences.
Solomon Asch’s (1952, 1956) experiments on group pressure and
conformity are perhaps some of the best-known exemplars of this
phenomenon: Asch presented groups of participants with cards
showing a reference line alongside a set of comparisons, and asked
members of the group to report which of the comparison lines was
equal in length to the reference. Of course, as is now well known,
each group contained only one real participant; the rest of the
group was made up of experimental confederates, instructed to
give obviously false judgements on a subset of pre-ordained trials.
Asch found that participants often went along with the group
consensus, even though it was obviously wrong, even though
the confederates were all strangers, and even though there were
no incentives to conform and no penalties for defecting. What
was particularly striking about Asch’s experimental results is their
suggestion that subsuming one’s own judgement to that of the
group might not be strategic; that it might have no moral or
material end—that it might be something much more banal, a
kind of path of least resistance in the face of social influence.
As a metonym for social psychology, Stanley Milgram’s (1963,
1965) obedience experiments perhaps loom even larger in the
popular imagination than Asch’s work. In Milgram’s studies,
people were told that they were participating in an experiment
on learning, and that they were to complete the task with another
person. Again, as is now well known, each participant was told
that she was assigned the role of “teacher”, while the other
participant—who was in fact an actor—was assigned the role of
“learner”. The experiment consisted of a series of trials in which
the teacher was required to quiz the learner: for every mistake the
learner made, the teacher was to administer (what they thought
was) an increasingly powerful electric shock. The finding that
has become most centrally associated with these experiments is
that a majority of people were willing to administer the electric
shocks, beyond an apparently safe level, when asked to do so
by an authoritative other. What interests us, however, is the way
in which Milgram’s studies extended the normative scope of the
statements produced by Asch’s: people did not merely conform to
social influence; they did so even to the point of causing serious
harm to others. “The social psychology of this century”, Milgram
(1974) himself would later reflect, “reveals a major lesson: often
it is not so much the kind of person a man [sic.] is as the kind of
situation in which he finds himself that determines how he will
act” (Milgram, 1974: 205).
Clearly, there is much to be said, here, about the mid-century
and post-war historical context of these studies, and their intense
focus on “intergroup relations, leadership, propaganda, organiza-
tions, political (e.g., voting) behavior, economic (e.g., consumer)
behavior, and environmental psychology” (Pepitone, 1981: 977).
Within such a space, it is not hard to understand how scholars may
have focused heavily on the susceptibility of people to the form of
persuasive messages over content (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981);
the fragility of the links between people’s convictions and their
actions (Darley and Batson, 1973); the impossibility of individual,
conscious free will (Wegner, 2002), and so on. At stake in all
of these experiments are two core claims: (1) that some motive
force outside of, or beyond, the individual, might drive particular
instances of actions and belief; and (2) that when people form
a group to interpret uncertain information, reach decisions, and
plan for action, the outcome is often not good. We situate these
interests not only in a post-war concern with propaganda and
inter-group relations, but also in wider social and economic
trends, manifested not least in the psychological sciences, that,
at least for much of this period, elevated the individual over the
collective: as Danziger (1994) again reminds us, throughout the
20th century, much institutionalized, mainstream psychological
research has gradually found itself in agreement with the late-
capitalist notion of an “independent individual for whose encap-
sulated qualities all social relations are [or should be] external”
(Danziger, 1994: 296).
Over time, of course, this marginalization of the positive
qualities of social interaction—what has been called the “negative
bias” in social psychology (Sheldon and King, 2001)—has been
drawn into question (It is worth nothing that this bias does not
exist everywhere: different views on the virtues of collectivity
and teamwork have long persisted especially in the organizational
and management literatures. See Guzzo and Shea, 1992, for an
overview). This “negative bias” is precisely the context in which we
wish to understand the OIM experiment, which tested a cliché—
that two heads are better than one—that was nonetheless at odds
with that tendency. Pairs of participants were asked to look at
two sets of visual stimuli, presented in sequence. In one set, the
contrast of one of the elements was slightly higher. The task was
to identify which set—the first or the second—contained the
stimulus with the higher contrast; participants first performed the
task alone, after which they were forced to make a joint decision.
The rules of the experimental game allowed for four models of
information sharing: (1) When participants disagreed in their
judgements, only the isolated individual judgements were shared,
and the joint decision was decided randomly (coin-flip or CF
model); (2) Individual judgements were again shared, but the
pair learned (from feedback) which person had the better track
record, and weighted their joint decision accordingly (behavior
and feedback or BF model); (3) Participants shared not only
their individual decisions, but also their degree of confidence in
their decisions, and weighed up their joint decision (weighted
confidence sharing or WCS model); and (4) Participants directly
shared the parameters of their sensory representations, as if these
representations were somehow transmittable through a direct
neural channel (direct signal sharing or DSS model).
Without wishing to go into excessive detail—the four mod-
els were fully specified quantitatively, and, within the contrived
experimental context, made distinct quantitative predictions,
which could straightforwardly be distinguished. With all trials
completed, the experimental data ultimately supported the WCS
model, showing that although people cannot communicate their
perceptions directly, they can and do improve their performance
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by comparing their confidence about those perceptions. The
implications of this finding were striking: not only could people
effectively communicate the certainty of their judgements, this
ability allowed them to outperform the best member of the pair (The
only catch was that people’s individual perceptual sensitivities
should not be too different from one another, and they should
be fairly accurate in evaluating how confident they were about
their own judgements). So contrary to the negative view of social
interaction prevailing in empirical social psychology at the time,
two heads really can be better than one. The qualities of the
“independent individual” have perhaps been radically over-stated.
Of course, this is only one experiment—a single case study—
and on its own it hardly moves the entire field of social cognitive
neuroscience towards a more expansive view of “the social” as
such (at least in the view of commentators who find the neu-
rosciences reductionistic on this score). Nor does it suffice to
demonstrate the over-arching point we’re gesturing at. Indeed,
many will point out that even here, irrespective of the result, what
is at stake is still some kind of “biologization” of the social—and
that that (including all the imperatives that are contained within
it) should be the focus of critical attention. Others will argue
that OIM is only another kind of falsification—that it leaves the
broader socio-political contours of the discipline untroubled. But,
as we argued at the beginning, what interests us here is neither a
dramatic revision of Critical Neuroscience nor some major event
in social psychology and neuroscience. Our goal is a more modest
one: we only want to suggest that, looked at in particular sort of
way, and interpreted in terms of a specific history, OIM might be
indicative of a more nuanced relationship between critique and
experiment than has yet been allowed in these literatures. We do
not say that there is anything about experimental design—still
less the specific design of this experiment, which may well have
produced a different kind of finding—that guarantees a “progres-
sive” or a “critical” result (nor, of course, was there intended to
be). What we are ultimately trying to show is only that the rules
of the neuroscientific and psychological experimental game—
and in particular that game’s insistence on associating particular
kinds of facthood with particular kinds of distance—are not
always the province of an unreflexive, reactionary cabal; that
there can be neuroscientifically-wrought, biologically-correlated,
methodologically-conservative factual imperatives, which seem
to make some more—for want of a better word—“progressive”
politics possible.
Perhaps our conclusion over-extrapolates from the data. But
that is partly the point. Because this experiment not only moves us
away from a negatively-biased social psychology more broadly—
it legitimates and actualizes a whole series of other statements,
both about human decision-making and about the virtues of
collectivity in general. Indeed, this set of statements was subse-
quently expanded by experiments that pushed at the edges of this
claim, showing how, in the scenario investigated by Bahrami et al.
the collective benefit of the group emerges over time (Bahrami
et al., 2012), and how this phenomenon is based on increased
alignment in the language used to express confidence (Fusaroli
et al., 2012). Moreover, if at a meta-theoretical level, the goal of
the experiment was to reveal strengths in social interaction, at
a methodological level the experiment was rigorously designed,
and it precisely tested competing quantitative models. Thus, if it
was critical of the way that social psychology had conjured the
virtues of interaction, it made this critique entirely from within
the confines of the social-psychological experimental game itself.
Again, if it is only one case, the OIM study might be interpreted
in terms of a broader, revised invocation of “the social” within
social psychology; but it has also had an impact beyond these dis-
cussions –having been covered extensively by mainstream media
outlets, and forming the basis for new experimental and meta-
theoretical discourses about the virtues of information-sharing
and open argumentation (e.g., Kanai and Banissy, 2010; Frith,
2012; Mercier and Sperber, 2012).
Before we concretize our analysis, let us add some important
qualifiers to this story. Needless to say, first, this study might have
gone another way; it might well have ended up re-enforcing the
same conservative assumptions about the virtues of the private
individual. But what’s interesting to us is that it didn’t: what
captures our attention is the realization that such a conservative
tendency is no special ally of the context-denying experimental
game. Our core claim is that OIM is an example of a study
which has not sought to examine its own biases and prejudices;
nor has it attempted to disrupt the overt exclusion of political
and economic contexts from experimental spaces; this is an
experiment, by contrast, whose adherence to the internal rules
of the experimental game of the neurosciences, whose delicate
manipulation of the accepted and canonical parameters for these
kinds of interventions, whose sensitivity to the dynamics of banal-
ity and strangeness within neuroscientific experimentation, has
allowed it to enact, propel, and legitimate, what might other-
wise be regarded as a progressive—even critical—intervention.
But here we add a second caution: if our claim for the critical
nature of this intervention relies on a shift in the psychological
gaze from the capacities of the individual to the virtues of the
collective, there is also a literature that locates the governing
power and force of contemporary capitalism precisely in a shift
to the efficiencies of flexible networks, and networked societies
(Sennett, 1999; Castells, 2000; Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007).
Through such a lens, OIM might be read as a demonstration—
even a biologization—of the productive efficiency of networked
collectivity (see especially Hartmann, 2012, on the relationships
between neuroscience and network capitalism). In this paper,
however, we do not claim that to move from the individual to the
collective is necessarily “progressive” or “good”—experiments,
Rheinberger (1994) reminds us, often have many stories to tell.
Our story is bound up with the psychological elevation of the
private individual (Danziger, 1994), an historical focus in that
discipline on the negative effects of group interaction (Pepitone,
1981), and contemporary strategies for governance that still rely
on the imagination of an atomized, psychologized, individual
subject (see Slaby, 2010: 407, for a potent, neurobiologically-
inflected example). It is in terms of this—still present—history
that we want to interpret OIM as a critical intervention, and
as a resource for (even an ally of) those who still see much to
critique in such formations. Of course this alliance remains always
in potentia; it is precisely the potentiality of OIM, and the forms
of alliance that may be drawn with and through it, that we direct
attention to here.
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ENACTING THE CRITICAL
We have argued that the intellectual force of Critical Neuro-
science turns on a very specific relationship between “critique”
and “neuroscience”. We suggested, further, that re-focusing on
the specifically experimental spaces of the new brain sciences
might help us to re-think this relationship. And we described one
case where the parameters of an experimental game produced
and legitimated some potent, critical statements form within a
social neuropsychology. In this final section, we draw out four
implications of that account.
CRITIQUE
We suggested earlier that at least three factors distinguish Crit-
ical Neuroscience: (1) it insists on a deeply classical notion of
“critique”, specifically as a self-consciously emancipatory, anti-
commercial, and anti-capitalist socio-critique, rooted in the
“historico-political” mission of the Frankfurt School (Slaby and
Choudhury, 2012: 29); (2) it argues that socio-critique is some-
thing (currently; not necessarily) exterior to the experimental
practices of the new brain sciences (if not to those sciences as
such); and (3) it proposes further that the “brain fact” is but
one node within a closed loop of mental phenomena, media
representations, political and economic contexts, and so on, and
that critical intervention is thus “studying the journey of a phe-
nomenon in and around the neuroscience lab”—but it is never
that journey itself (Choudhury et al., 2009: 64. Our emphasis).
We are much in sympathy with these arguments. But we use
the OIM experiment to show that, even if we wish to hold onto
such a notion of “critique”, we do not necessarily need the form of
inquiry that these authors propose. The OIM experiment shows
that, sometimes, nothing more than playing within the conven-
tions and procedures that make up the experimental setting is
required for the enactment of a prominent, and widely-publicized
critique of—in this case—the deeply troubling, and intensely
political, individualizing tendencies of much contemporary psy-
chology and neuroscience. Unquestionably, the experiment, pub-
lished in Science, created a very traditional, context-denying,
unimpeachably “scientific” new “brain-fact”. And yet still this
modest fact makes many strikingly critical statements possible—
even necessary—within the new brain sciences: human beings
often work sub-optimally when they work alone; collectivity
trumps individualization, at least under some conditions; the
communication of evidence is a delicate and subtle process; accu-
rate knowledge is less an attribute of the single individual than a
product of careful co-operation—so, on and on, go the claims that
can be made. We argue that, irrespective of our notion of critique,
we still need to extend our notion of a critical apparatus beyond an
externally-focused, experimentally-indifferent, text-based form of
(sometimes) scholastic nit-picking. Critical Neuroscience, if it is
to further its contribution, might recognize that critique can be in
brain-facts too.
POLITICS
There is an odd correspondence between, on the one hand,
some of the central assumptions of Critical Neuroscience and, on
the other, general enthusiasm about the power and force of the
contemporary neurosciences (e.g., Lynch and Laursen, 2010). If
on first glance these seem like diametrically opposed literatures,
still neither of them sees the neurobiological experiment, and
the formal rules that demarcate it, as a way of potentially doing
political critique (Fitzgerald and Callard, Forthcoming). Critical
neuroscience is insistent that the formal laboratory-space of the
contemporary neurosciences, and the regulations that govern it,
are—rightly or wrongly; accurately or mistakenly—a more-or-
less politics-free zone (Slaby, 2010: 406; Slaby and Choudhury,
2012: 39). By contrast, we have drawn on the OIM experiment
to show that politics might sometimes be found in strange places
(even occasionally outside of Frankfurt); that it can be expressed
through some unexpected experimental practices (even in some
quantitatively-specified neuroscientific modeling techniques).
Defenders of Critical Neuroscience might here say that we
have missed the point; the whole purpose of these authors’
intervention has been to say that the seclusion from the political
is merely rhetorical, that the experiment is of course always-
already profoundly ideological (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012: 31).
The main issue, moreover, is not a lack of politics, but the
wrong politics—neuroscientific experiments are laid low by the
“surprising parallel” between “cutting-edge neuroscience”, “orga-
nizational and management literature” and “neoliberal politics”
(Slaby, 2010: 405). But the OIM experiment allows us to come
at this relationship from quite a different angle—one that is
intended to illuminate, rather than dispute, its characterization
in the Critical Neuroscience literature. First, via its critique of
the individualizing tendencies of social psychology, it shows us
concretely how even the “depoliticalized” rhetorical game of exper-
imentation might not be as demure as it first appears—that a
carefully assembled, straightforward neuroscientific experiment
can make a (potentially) critical intervention. So if we want to
understand the relationship between politics and neuroscience,
we will need some detailed account of experimental practices,
and of the kinds of claims that those practices make possible.
Second, it shows us how the politics expressed through this
game can serve some “progressive” ends, such as provincializing
the negative bias towards human sociality within contemporary
psychology, and enabling a stream of experimentation on the
potency and primacy of interaction and cooperation—a research-
finding arguably quite inimical to at least some contemporary
forms of neoliberal politics (but note again our qualifiers to this
conclusion, discussed above). To realize this potency, you need
to know the rules of the game—but you also need to know
how those rules might be used for subtle and surprising ends.
In order to understand the relationship between neuroscience
and the potential for a more emancipatory, collective claim, you
could do a lot worse than pay attention to classically-constituted
psychophysical experiments.
CONTEXT
Re-positioning experiments in their “context” is central to the
mission of Critical Neuroscience: scientists should “be involved
in the analysis of ‘contextual’ factors”, (Slaby, 2010: 397); “neu-
roscientists need to critically examine scientific practices and
institutions as well as the wider social contexts within which they
work” (Choudhury et al., 2009: 65); “the gathering of context in
many cases may end up laying bare the economic and political
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imperatives that sustain particular styles of thought” (Slaby and
Choudhury, 2012: 35). Over and over again, reversion to “con-
text” is positioned as the weapon wielded by the critical imper-
ative: it opens up the black-box of experimentation, allowing
experimenters to see the ideological constraints within which they
produce and disseminate knowledge. But we have tried to show
that the relationship between the experiment and its context is
not so straightforward—that the elision of context is not always a
mark of deficit.
What makes experimental demonstration so potent, of course,
is that the rules of the game require everyone to pretend that
context doesn’t exist—that facts are somehow independent of the
alarmingly human and social circumstances in which they have
been assembled (Latour, 1987). We have no interest, here, in re-
running philosophical or social-scientific debates about the struc-
tures of experiment (for which see e.g., Moghaddam and Harré,
1992; Shapin, 2010; Rheinberger, 2011). But we are interested in
seeing how the formal elision of context (whether or not we agree
with it; whether or not we think it’s ever actually enacted in prac-
tice) allows researchers to do and say particular kinds of things—
and not all of them bad, or reactionary. What we have tried to
show with the OIM demonstration is that the context-denying
performance of an experimental game does not have to traduce
the critical imperative—that it can, in fact, enact and legitimate a
whole slew of critical interventions. More importantly, perhaps, to
the extent that neuroscientific facts are (of course) always-already
embedded in a context—then the interesting question might be
less “how can we use ‘context’ to destabilize the facts that already
exist?”; and more, “how can we play with context—including
hiding it, denying it, excluding it—to facilitate the generation
of facts that we want to bring into being ourselves?” (cf. Latour,
2010). It is an attention to experiment that is the radical gesture,
here; not context. And it is precisely that quality of attention
that allows these scholars to enact a Science-sanctioned sign of
resistance to conventional thinking in the field (Fleck, 1979; cf.
Roepstorff, 2002).
EXPERIMENT
So how, finally, are we to think about neuroscientific experiments?
More specifically: what should our attitude towards them be?
How seriously should we take them? As we suggested earlier,
an odd feature of much external commentary on neuroscien-
tific experiment is its suspension between two poles: on the
one hand, experiments are taken very seriously indeed. This
is the experiment as a kind of reductionist terror, produc-
ing highly technified, publicly-valued, severely-reduced studies,
which are “thought to be assuming the role of guidance in
many people’s lives, both practically and through being incor-
porated into their self-understanding” (Choudhury et al., 2009:
63). On the other hand, experimental knowledge is not taken
seriously at all. This is the experiment as thinly-veiled word-
game, one whose thin, mediatized claims are easily taken apart
once we “scrutinize and lay bare scientific conventions that are
taken for granted, [as well as] tacit knowledge, [and] vested
interests at work in neuroscience research or their impacts on
people” (Slaby and Choudhury, 2012: 39). These are carica-
tures of complex arguments, of course—but they help us to
draw attention to this strange back-and-forth between terror and
dismissal.
By drawing attention to the OIM experiment, we argue for
a Goldilocks approach within the sociology and philosophy of
neuroscience: experiments should be taken just seriously enough.
Throughout this paper, we have described the OIM experiment’s
adherence to the “rules of a game”, and the care with which it
arranges the props, tools, conventions, apparatuses and devices
that make neuroscientific knowledge possible. But we also think
that rules, games, tools, conventions and props are non-trivial
things. To recognize this experiment as a clever move, within a
specific game, is to both take it for what it is, and value it for
what it is. We have shown how it was precisely an awareness
of, and adherence to, the rigors and rules of the experimental
game that allowed these scientists to intervene in unexpected,
critical ways, and even to generate new “progressive” claims about
collectivity and individuality. Indeed, we want to suggest that
not only do experiments not have to be (either scientifically or
politically) perfect to be interesting; it is precisely because they
are not perfect that they are interesting (Rheinberger, 1994).
The OIM experiment takes the experimental game just seriously
enough to have its claims treated as consequential and impactful;
but not so seriously that it cannot play within the taken-for-
granted rules of the game, that it cannot thereby reach out to
broader political and social landscapes, that it cannot produce
other kinds of strange statements too. Not for nothing does the
paper conclude its sober analysis about success in locating good
evidence between individuals with the observation that “we know
all too well about the catastrophic consequences of consulting
‘evidence’ of unknown reliability on problems as diverse as the
existence of weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of
risk-free investments” (Bahrami et al., 2010: 1084). Being able to
make such a claim, in a journal like Science, is precisely what we
refer to when we urge commentators to learn to take experiments
“just seriously enough”.
CONCLUSION
So what should be the Critical in Critical Neuroscience? After
all, much as the Critical Neuroscientists look upon neuroscience
itself, we are not invested in tearing down Critical Neuroscience—
merely inviting it to reflect on the biases and assumptions inher-
ent in its own approach, asking it to examine the forms of politics
it enacts, and encouraging it, in its turn, to consider especially
the methodological assumptions through which it enacts them.
We have tried to show that, in the rush to critique and to reform
neuroscience; in the desire to remake it as a more socially and
politically incisive discipline; in the stern denunciation of its ties
to managerial, pharmaceutical and other spaces of neoliberal
accumulation; in the demand that it be reflexive, and self-critical,
and more obviously and openly aware of its own surroundings—
in all of this, broader questions about how critique might be
enacted within the mundane rules of the contemporary neuro-
scientific game have been missed. We have argued that, contra the
literature up to now, the first question for a specifically critical
neuroscience needs to be: what can neuroscience do? We do not
here offer any kind of comprehensive answer. But what we have
tried to gesture at is the realization that if neuroscience can help
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to govern and surveil us; if it can pathologize us and reduce us
to our biological parts; if it can induce us to buy drugs, nudge
us to change our behavior, and help us to become more rigidly
bourgeois in our parenting—then surely it can also help us to
imagine and enact ourselves, and our societies, and the political,
economic and cultural assumptions on which those societies are
organized, in some more interesting and hopeful ways too. We
have demonstrated just one minor instance of how this might
work, and how a critical political statement can be made possible
entirely within the constraints of contemporary experimental
practice. But our central contribution has been to argue that the
critical imaginary of Critical Neuroscience, if it does not require
radical reform, at least needs a broader sense of its own possibility.
We have urged attention to the critical impetus of experiment,
here—but there are likely many similar arguments waiting to be
made.
At the end of their 2009 programmatic contribution, Choud-
hury et al. point out that the neurosciences are making progress
further and further into areas that were once dominated by
the humanities, the social sciences, the clinical arts, and so on
(73–74). But their own goal, they stress, is less keeping the
neurosciences out of these domains, but in creating the ground
for “critical engagement” that will ultimately “drive new ideas
for experiments in neurosciences” (ibid.). They wish to show
sociologists and anthropologists how they, too, might help “to
influence the shape of future research in neuroscience” (ibid.).
Here, we are in total agreement with Choudhury et al. But our
suggestion is that such engagement is unlikely to come from an
instance on implacable context; indeed, the central gambit of this
paper is that it might be more “experiment”, and less “context”,
that forms the meeting-ground between neuro-biological and
socio-political research practices in the 21st century. We join with
our colleagues in philosophy and the social sciences, and even in
critical theory, who are interested in the practices and effects of
the neuroscientific laboratory. But what we want to stress is that,
if they do cross the experimental threshold, it might not be so
unthinkable for such scholars to just run with the rules of the
game as they find them. In other words, it might not be so terrible
to go into the experiment, and to leave the world where it is for a
moment; to set aside an otherwise valuable attention to “politics”,
and “interest”; to leave the workings of “society” and “culture”
where they are; and finally, even if only temporarily, to (quietly)
close the laboratory door.
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